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REEMPLOYMENT AND READJUSTMENT
RIGHTS OF VETERANSt
CHARu s R. JoNAs*
Maior, JAGD, AUS

One of the gravest problems this country has ever faced in peace
time will be the problem of the reintegration of ten or twelve million
returning soldiers and sailors into our economic life. The magnitude
of this task will be manifest when it is remembered that today we are
breaking all known production records in industry and agriculture without any help at all from half of the men of the country between the
ages of 18 and 38. These men are in the armed forces and their services, therefore, are not and have not been available in this period of
our greatest expansion of production. To make a place in industry,
agriculture, and business for twice as many men as are now so engaged,
between 18 and 38, without seriously disrupting the employment of
those presently at work and without creating undisposable surpluses of
all kinds of goods with an inevitable aftermath of depression and eco-

nomic ruin, will be an undertaking of transcendent proportions.
The blueprint designed for the Government's attack upon this problem will be found in Section 8 of the Selective Service Act,' in the "GI
Bill of Rights," 2 in other federal legislation relating to returning servicemen, and in the "George" Bill which deals with the problems of converting industry from a war-time to a peace-time basis. These acts are
all related and deal with the general problem which will confront our
country in the crucial days ahead; but the scope of the present article
will be restricted to a discussion of the veteran's reemployment rights
under the Selective Service Act and his readjustment rights under the
"GI Bill of Rights."
t This article was rewritten from a speech given by the author before the
North Carolina State Bar at its annual meeting in Raleigh, October 17, 1944.
* A.B., University of North Carolina, 1925; J.D., University of North Carolina,
1928; member of the Lincolnton, N. C., Bar; on duty in military assignment to
North Carolina State Headquarters, Selective Service System, Raleigh, N. C.
'SEEcrm TRAINING AN] SEvicF Acr OF 1940, as amended; Pub. L. No. 783,

76th Cong. (Sept. 16, 1940) ; 54
1944).

STAT.

885 (1940); 50 U. S. C. A. §308 (Supp.

Section 8 is affected by Sections 4 and 7 of the SERVIcE ExTENsiox ACT OF
STAT. 627 (1941); 50

1941; Pub. L. No. 213, 77th Cong. (Aug. 18, 1941); 55
U. S. C. A. §357 (Supp. 1944).

'SERVICEMEN's
READJUSTMENT ACT OF 1944; Pub. L. No. 346, 78th Cong.
(June 22, 1944) ; 58 STAT. 284 (1944) ; 38 U. S. C. A., c. 14 (1944).
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I. REEMPLOYMENT
The Selective Service Act3 provides that, under certain conditions,
every returning veteran who worked for the Federal Government or for
a private employer before he entered service may have his old job back
if he wants it, and may not be discharged without cause for one year
thereafter. If he was employed by a state or political sub-division thereof, he may not demand his old job back and necessarily get it, but the
Act declares it to be the sense of the Congress that such person should
be restored to any such position if he seeks it or to a position of like
seniority, status, and pay.
The Act 4 requires the Director of Selective Service to organize a
Personnel Division with adequate facilities to render aid (1) in the
replacement of veterans in their former jobs and (2) in securing new
positions for returning veterans. This division has been established
and is now functioning at high speed. Responsibility has been delegated
by the Director to the various state directors to organize and supervise
the program within their states. 5 The State Director for North Carolina has been very active in this field and the State is fairly well organized now in this effort.
This responsibility in the field of replacement and placement has
been passed along to local Selective Service boards, and all of the boards
in North Carolina have been so advised and understand their duties in
this respect. 6 All of the facilities of the local- board offices have been
made available for use in the program. In addition, a Reemployment
Committeeman has been appointed to work in each local board area.
Upon separation from service, every serviceman is instructed to report
to his local Selective Service board and to the Reemployment Committeeman for information and assistance. Close liaison is being maintained and will continue to be maintained in the prosecution of this
effort between the Selective Service System and other departments and
agencies of the Federal, State and local governments.
The President, by executive order, 7 has placed additional responsibilities on the Selective Service System in connection with the reemployment of veterans. By this order there has been created in the
Office of War Mobilization a Retraining and Reemployment Administration. In addition, a Retraining and Reemployment Policy Board has
been established. 8 This board is composed of representatives of the
'Supra, note 1.
'Supra, note 1, at sect. 8(g).
'Local Board Memorandum No. 190, National Headquarters, Selective Service
System, issued March 1, 1944, amended June 30, 1944.
' State Director's Circular Letters to North Carolina Local Boards: Nos. 291,
issued June 22, 1943; 389, issued January 1, 1944; 459, issued July 15, 1944; 465,
issued July 28, 1944; 472, issued August 26, 1944; 484, issued September 29, 1944.
'Executive Order No. 9427, issued February 24, 1944, 9 Fzv. REG. 2199 (1944).
6Ibid.
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following Federal agencies: Department of Labor, Federal Security
Agency, War Manpower Commission, Selective Service System, Veterans' Administration, Civil Service Commission, War Department,
Navy Department, and War Production Board.
The Retraining and Reemployment Administration has directed the
establishment in each state of a State Veterans' Service Committee to
represent the Selective Service System, the War Manpower Commission, and the Veterans' Administration in making available to veterans
full information relative to their employment and reemployment rights.9
It has also provided for the establishment in each community of a
Local Veterans' Service Committee to carry out at the local level instructions issued by the State Veterans' Service Committee and by the
Retraining and Reemployment Administration, and to act as a central
point in the local community for mobilization of the efforts of volunteer
and other groups in furnishing ififormation relative to their employment
rights to returning veterans. 10
Thus it will be seen that definite plans have been made by the
agencies of the Federal Government charged with responsibility in this
field to render the necessary aid and assistance to veterans who seek
reinstatement in their former positions or new positions. The problem
does not present serious difficulties today while there are more jobs than
men to fill them. But as the rate of discharges increases the problems

involved will necessarily increase. It is well to know that the Government is making long-range plans and adopting procedures in an effort
to be prepared to handle the problem effectively when it bursts upon us
in full tide.
It was stated in the beginning that, under certain conditions, every
returning veteran who worked for the Federal Government or for a
private employer before he entered service may have his old job back
if he wants it. There are six of these conditions, as follows:
1. The first condition is that the veteran must have entered upon
active military or naval service of the United States subsequent to May
1, 1940. This includes any man or woman who served in the Army,
Navy, Marine Corps or Coast Guard." No distinction is made between
volunteers and men drafted or between enlisted men and officers; all
are included.
" By Order No. 1, issued May 17, 1944.
20 Ibid.
"1Section 7 of the SERvIcE ExTENsio Acr OF 1941; Pub. L. No. 213, 77th
Cong. (Aug. 18, 1941) ; 55 STAT. 627 (1941) ; 50 U. S. C. A. §357 (Supp. 1944),
provides that the reemployment provisions of the SELEcrVm TRAINING AND SERVICE
AcT oF 1940 (Supra, note 1) shall be applicable to "any person who, subsequent to
May 1, 1940 .... shall have entered upon active military or naval service in the
land or naval forces of the United States . . ". Right to reinstatement in former
position was extended to members of Merchant Marine by Act of June 23, 1943;
57 STAT. 162 (1943) ; 50 U. S. C. A. §1472 (Supp. 1944).
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2. The second condition is that the veteran must have satisfactorily
completed his service. Therefore, discharge or release from service
must have been under honorable conditions.
3. The third condition is that the veteran must apply for his old job
within forty days 12 after his separation from service. This provision
seems clear and uncontroversial yet questions may arise under it. For
example, suppose a returned veteran applies for reinstatement within
the period required by the Act but wishes to defer reporting for work
for a while longer, for reasons that may be satisfactory to himself. The
employer is anxious for him to begin work as soon as possible because
he needs him then and may not need him at all later. The veteran
contends that all he has to do is apply for his job within the period
designated by the Act and that he does not necessarily have to begin
work within said period. The employer, however, contends that, in
addition to making application for reinstatement, the veteran must report for work within said period or forfeit the protection afforded him
by the Act. It is submitted that the Act would have been clearer if it
had stated that the veteran must report for work within the period he
is required to apply for reinstatement, if such was the intent of the
Congress. The Act simply provides that one of the conditions of reinstatement is that the veteran "makes application for reemployment
14
within forty days' 3 after he is relieved from such training and service."
The Director of Selective Service has stated it as his opinion that,
while the employer cannot, strictly speaking, extend the period, he can
voluntarily reemploy the veteran thereafter; and he may, as a part of
the reemployment contract, agree that the veteran shall be entitled to
the benefits of Section 8 of the Act.1 5 Such an agreement, to be enforceable, would have to be clear and explicit, otherwise it is the Director's opinion that, even though the veteran may be employed it is
doubtful if he can force the additional benefits conferred by the Act as
to seniority, pay, and tenure for one year.10
'Legislation amending Section 8(b) of the SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT (Supra,
note 1) by extending this period from forty to ninety days became law December

8, 1944. The amendment provides that application for reinstatement may be made
within ninety days following release from hospitalization provided such hospitalization follows immediately after separation from service and extends for a period

of not more than one year from date of separation. National Headquarters, Selective Service System, takes the position that a veteran separated from service
prior to enactment of the amendment is entitled to the ninety day period provided
the ninety day period, measured from date of discharge or release from hospital,

has not expired by December 8, 1944. This change will go a long way toward
meeting the objection that enough time is not allowed the veteran to make his

adjustment
from military service to civilian employment.
13
14

Now ninety (Supra, note 12).

Supra, note 1, at sect. 8(b) (3).
x Paragraph 2 of Part III of Local Board Memorandum No. 190-A, National
Headquarters, Selective Service System, issued May 20, 1944.

"8Supra, note 15.
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4. The fourth condition is that the veteran must be "qualified to
perform the duties of such position." Here is where we may expect
trouble. Whether the veteran is "qualified" will be a question of fact
which, in case of dispute, will have to be decided by the courts and may
well be a source of much litigation. Without undertaking to say how
the courts may be expected to interpret this particular language, it
seems safe to speculate that they will say that employers may not require veterans seeking their old jobs to meet higher standards than
were in effect when the jobs were vacated; that they may not establish
higher standards for returning veterans than they demand of nonveterans; that they may not require veterans to meet higher standards
which the employer may have established since the veteran entered
military service; and that they may not, during the veteran's absence,
upgrade the position he formerly held so as to exclude him on the
ground that he is not qualified to perform the work.
5. The fifth condition is that the job which the veteran seeks to be
reinstated in must have been "other than a temporary position." Here
again we face trouble, perhaps seriois trouble. What is a "temporary
position"? Every case will of course have to stand on its own bottom
and the courts will have to decide unless the parties can agree.
The Director of Selective Service has stated it as his opinion that,
generally speaking, one who is employed to fill a place made vacant by
a person who enters service occupies a "temporary" status and has no
reemployment rights in that position even though he subsequently enters
service.17 That seems a reasonable and fair construction. Obviously
an ordinary employer will not be able to reinstate five men who might
have held one job sutccessively unless he has a tremendous increase in
business or discharges employees on "other" jobs.
A very practical aspect of this particular problem will be apparent
from the following illustration:
John Smith, prior to entering service, was employed by X Company.
Bill Jones was employed to take Smith's place and later Jones himself
was drafted and Henry Johnson replaced him. When Smith and Jones
come home, Smith will get his job back but Jones will not unless it is
held that his position was "other than a temporary" one or unless X
Company voluntarily makes a place for him. But if the company can
use only one man on the particular job, Jones and Johnson will have
to seek employment elsewhere. This may turn out to be hard on Bill
Jones because he served his country in time of war just as faithfully
and sacrificed perhaps as much as Smith did. We shall have to satisfy
Jones in some other way. Perhaps the various agencies that are being
organized to look after returning veterans will be able to place him in
"7Paragraph 4(b) of Part III of Local Board Memorandum N7o. 190-A, National Headquarters, Selective Service System, issued May 20, 1944.
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a new job, or he may be able to qualify for vocational training or the
educational advantages or receive a loan of money to go into business for
himself as provided for under the 'GI Bill of Rights."' 8 At least the
Government is going to be vitally interested in him and will do everything possible to see that he finds employment. But what about Henry
Johnson? Maybe he is a veteran of the first World War and was induced to take the place first vacated by Smith and later by Jones because he was persuaded that the job was vital on the production front;
and, since he could not shoulder a rifle and fight with the Army, he
felt that he should do everything possible to support the war effort, so
he gave up his job in a non-essential industry and took the one with X
Company. Unless X Company can make another place for him, he
will have to go out and seek another job and will not have any of the
advantages or benefits provided by the "GI Bill of Rights" but will be
left more or less to shuffle for himself. Individuals such a" Henry
Johnson are liable to be the forgotten men in the future.
Many of the cases which we may expect to arise under this condition will be ones involving new jobs created because of war expansion.
Prior to the war, X Company may have had 100 employees but due to
expansion of business as a direct result of the war, the company found
it necessary to double the number of employees; and, before the war
ends, it has given up a substantial number of these new employees, as
well as some of its original group, to the services. Will these so-called
"new" employees be entitled to their jobs back as well as the original
100? This is a problem which will have to be faced and solved perhaps
in every community in the country.
The Act 19 simply provides that the veteran shall have his job back
if it was "other than a temporary position." But what is a "temporary
position"? We may speculate about it at will and make various interpretations and constructions of the language used in the Act, but in the
last analysis it will be for the courts to decide. The facts and circumstances in each individual case will determine the answer. Of course,
the foresighted employer could have taken care of the situation by
having it definitely understood with the "new" employees that they
were being hired for the duration, but how many employers were foresighted enough to think of this?
It seems that it would be most unreasonable to hold that a person
who was employed on a "new" job which was created to take care of
expanded production as a direct result .of the war and which, at the
time of employment, might reasonably be expected to be discontinued
after the emergency has passed, had "other than a temporary" position
within the meaning of the Act. Such a holding would impose im" Supra, note 2.
19
Supra, note 1, at sect. 8(b).
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possible conditions upon employers in the "war baby" industries such
as the manufacturing of aeroplanes, ships, guns, tanks, etc., in which
vast expansion in employment has taken place.
6. The sixth condition is that an employer is not required to reinstate the veteran if the employer's circumstances have so changed as
to make it "unreasonable or impossible to do so." This is probably
the most controversial language in the act.
Suppose X Company was wholly engaged in the manufacture of
civilian goods when John Smith left. As the production of war goods
became critical, X Company was moved to convert to war work. The
war ends suddenly, and war contracts are cancelled. At that time John
Smith and a good many others seek to reclaim their jobs. But it takes
time for X Company to reconvert from a war to a peace-time basis.
Perhaps new machinery and tools will have to be procured with the
result that the company cannot resume full civilian production for
months. Must the company rehire John Smith and the others immediately, or may it wait until reconversion is complete? Probably not
until the plant reopens. But suppose the plant does not completely
close down but goes on a curtailed basis or is forced into a seasonal
shut-down during the year, and the particular job that John Smith
formerly held is one of those discontinued temporarily. Does Smith
step aside, or is he entitled to one of the few jobs that do continue to
run? Undoubtedly he will be entitled to one of the jobs that continue.
But what if there are not enough of these jobs to go around? Who
gets the ones that are available? Probably the first ones to apply.
All of the foregoing are preliminary questions that naturally lead
to the main one, which is this: What constitutes such a change in an
employer's circumstances as to make a veteran's reinstatement "unreasonable or impossible"? That is the "sixty-four dollar" question,
and the lawyer who discovers the correct answer to it will probably find
that management will make a beaten path to his door.
The Act further provides that the returning veteran shall be restored
20
to his former position without any loss of seniority, status, and pay.
In fact, the Act specifically provides that the veteran shall be considered
as having been on furlough or leave of absence during his period of
service, and all of the natural accumulated advantages of continuous
service accrue to him during his absence. It is under this feature of
the Act that we may run into some difficulties with labor unions. What
if X Company has entered into a contract with a union since Smith left,
and suppose the terms of the union contract provide certain standards
for employment. Suppose John Smith does not meet those standards,
or suppose he declines to join the union.21 Perhaps there will not be
"Supra, note 1, at sect. 8(c).V. Keesling, Jr., Chief Liaison and Legislative
See testimony of Col. F.
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much difficulty in either of these suppositions, but it is reasonable to
speculate what may happen in some cases if Smith should decline to
join the union; and a loyal dues-paying member of the union, with more
seniority than Smith, is discharged in order to make a place for Smith.
Certainly the future holds many vexatious problems which will arise,
calculated to tax the patience and judgment of all concerned.
The Act also provides that if an employer refuses to comply with
the reemployment provisions, the United States Court for the district
in which the employer maintains a place of business shall have power
to require specific compliance and to compensate the veteran for any
loss of wages or benefits suffered by reason of the employer's refusal.2 2
Such cases shall be advanced on the calendar for speedy trial; and the
United States Attorney, if he is reasonably satisfied that the veteran is
entitled to relief, is required by law to bring the action without any
cost to the veteran and no fees or court costs shall be taxed against
him, even if he loses.23
Not much jurisprudence has yet been developed on the subject but
one recent case is worthy of note. It is the case of Hall v. Union Light,
24
Heat and Power Company.
In this case plaintiff was defendant's regular employee when he was
inducted April 25, 1942. He was honorably discharged June 4, 1942,
and on June 7, 1942, applied for his old job. He was not put back to
work until September 28, 1942, and sued for $512.00 which was the
amount he would have been entitled to from June 7, 1942 to September

28, 1942.
The defendant argued that the Act was unconstitutional as repugnant to the Fifth Amendment and took the further position that the
terms "unreasonable" and "impossible" are so vague and uncertain as
to render the statute unenforceable because the Act fixed no immutable
standard, but left the standard to the variant views of the different
courts and juries which may be called upon to enforce it. He cited
United States v. Cohen Grocery Company,25 which declared an Act of
Congress unconstitutional because the term used therein, "unjust or
unreasonable," were held to be too vague, indefinite and uncertain to be
enforceable.
The District Court, however, made the distinction that the Cohen
case was a criminal prosecution under an indictment whereas the instant
Officer, Selective Service System, before the House Committee on Military Af-

fairs, September 12, 1944, for a statement of the view of the Director of Selective
Service that a veteran should not be required to join the union to be reinstated
in his former position even though the shop or plant had become union organized
while22 he was away.
SuPra, note 1, at sect. 8
6(c).
" Ibid.
F. Supp. 817 (E. D. Ky. 1944). •52
"255 U S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct. 298, 65 L. ed. 516 (1921).
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case was a civil suit. The court specifically held the Act to be constitutional but did not so hold on the merits of the case supporting its
decision by relying on the well-recognized principles that "public statutes
dealing with the welfare of the whole people are to have a liberal interpretation" and that "every reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor
of the constitutionality of the statute" and "that it should not be adjudged invalid unless its unconstitutionality is dear, complete and unmistakeable."
26
Another recent case is that of Kay v. General Cable Corporation
in which the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in a decision handed down
September 12, 1944, held that a company doctor, officially designated
as "medical director" held a position "in the employ" of the company
within the meaning of the Act and that he was entitled to reinstatement
even though it was considered that his employment would result in some
loss of efficiency and some additional expense. The court said that the
term "unreasonable" as used in the Act means more than inconvenience
and undesirable.
Herein lie several illustrations to show some of the problems that
we may expect to arise under this Act. Other illustrations will no
doubt occur to the reader, but the ones used are sufficient to demonstrate
the manifold ramifications of the problems which industry and business
will have to face "when Johnny comes marching home again." It seems
fairly clear that the role of the employer in the days that lie ahead is
not going to be an untroubled one. He shall find himself greatly in
need of sound advice and counsel from his lawyer.

II. READJUSTMENT
The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944,27 popularly known as
the "GI Bill of Rights," became law on June 22, 1944. Anyone interested in the subject will of course wish to read and study the act
for himself. This article shall cite briefly some of the uncontroversial
provisions of the act and proposes to undertake an analysis of three of
its most important features which deal with education, loans, and unemployment benefits.
TITLE

I: HOSPITALIZATION, CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES

The principal provisions of this title are the following:
1. The Veterans' Administration is declared to be an essential war
agency and entitled, second only to the War and Navy Departments, to
priorities in personnel, equipment, supplies and material in its adminis2
tration of the benefits provided by the Act. S
144 F. (2d) 653 (1944).
Pub. L. No. 346, 78th Cong. (June 22, 1944); 58 STAT. 284 (1944); 38
U. S. C. A. c. 14 (Supp. 1944). See also Chapter 12.
" Id. at sect. 100.
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2. Five hundred million dollars are authorized to be appropriated
for the construction of additional hospital facilities. 2 0
3. No person shall be discharged or released from active duty in the
armed forces unless he is given a discharge certificate and final pay or
unless arrangements are made to deliver same to his next of kin or legal
representative. 30
4. No person shall be discharged or released from active service on
account of disability unless or until he has executed a claim for compensation, pension or hospitalization, or has signed a statement that he
has had explained to him his right to do so. His refusal or failure to
file such claim shall be without prejudice to any right he may subsequently assert.3 '
5. No person in the armed forces shall be required to sign any statement relating to the origin or nature of any disease or injury he may
have, and any such statement signed against his own interest is declared
32
to be null and void and of no force and effect.
6. The services are authorized and directed to permit the functioning in discharge centers of authorized representatives of the American
Red Cross, national veterans' organizations and the Veterans' Administration for the purpose of assisting discharged veterans with their
problems under the Act and otherwise. 33
7. The discharge or dismissal by sentence of a general court martial
of any person from service, or the discharge of any person on the ground
that he is a conscientious objector who refused to perform military duty,
wear the uniform or otherwise comply with lawful orders, or as a deserter, or of an officer by the acceptance of his resignation for the good
of the service, shall bar all rights of such person under this or any
other law administered by the Veterans' Administration.3 4 This provision would not apply if the person at the time of the offense was
insane or to any War Risk or National Service Life Insurance policy.3 5
8. The Secretaries of War and Navy are directed to set up special
boards to review, upon their own motion or upon request of a former
officer or enlisted man or woman or, if deceased, of his surviving spouse,
next of kin or legal representative, the type and nature of discharge or
dismissal except those made as the result of a sentence of general court
martial; and such special boards are given power to change the type of
discharge given. Request for such review must be made within fifteen
years after such discharge or dismissal. 6
"Id. at sect. 103.
Id. at sect. 104.
"Id.
sect. 105.
104.
"'Id.at
at sect.

"Id. at sect. 200(a).
,Id. at sect. 300.
"Id. at sect. 300.
"Id. at sect. 301.
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ACT

The provisions of this title may be summarized as follows:
1. Any honorably discharged veteran who served in the armed
forces on or after September 16, 1940, and whose education or training
was impeded, delayed, interrupted or interfered with by reason of such
service, or who desires a refresher or retraining course, and who shall
have served ninety days or more, or shall have been discharged from
service by reason of a service-connected injury or disability, shall be
eligible for and entitled to receive the education or training provided by
the ActL3
2. Any person who was not over 25 years of age at the time he
entered service shall be deemed to have had his education or training
impeded, delayed, interrupted or interfered with. This provision makes
all honorably discharged veterans who were not over 25 years of age
when they entered service eligible for these educational benefits.38
3. Application for the benefits must be made not later than two
years after the date of discharge or the termination of the present war,
whichever is the later.3 9
4. The education provided for by the Act shall not be available
after seven years following the close of the present war. 40
5. In no event shall the total period of the education provided for
under the Act exceed four years unless a period of instruction ends in
the midst of a quarter or a semester, in which event it shall be extended
41
to the end thereof.
6. Any eligible person shall be entitled to education for a period of
one year, or the equivalent thereof in part-time study, or for such lesser
time as may be required for the course of instruction chosen by him.
7. Upon satisfactory completion of the one year of education, such
person shall be entitled to an additional period of education not to exceed the time such person was in the active service on or after September 16, 1940, and before the termination of the war, exclusive of the
time he was assigned for a course in the ASTP Program or the Naval
College Training Program, which course was a continuation of his
civilian course and was continued to completion, or as a cadet or midshipman at one of the service academies. This means that ninety days
of service would entitle a veteran, otherwise qualified, to one year of
education; a year of service would entitle him to two years of education;
"Id. at sect. 400(b). These provisions appear as Title II, #400(b), Pub. L.
No. 346; but the legislation amounts to the addition of a new Part VIII by way
of amendment to VTRaAxs REGULAT N numbered l(a). See 58 STAT. 291
(1944) ; 38 U. S. C. A. c. 268, Title II, sect. 403 (1944).
Id. at sect. 400(b) I.

"Ibid.
"See fiote 37, supra at sect. 400(b) 2.

,0 Ibd.
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two years of service would entitle him to three years of education; and
three years of service would entitle him to four years of education.
8. The Veterans' Administration shall secure from time to time a
list of the educational and training institutions in each state from the
appropriate state agency and institutions so listed shall be approved
under this program. Any person eligible for education under the Act
shall have the right to elect any approved institution, whether located
in the state of his residence or not, and may take his training there if
42
the institution will accept him as a student.
9. For reasons that must be satisfactory to the Veterans' Administration, the veteran may change his course of instruction at any time,
and the Veterans' Administration may discontinue the payment for such
education at any time if the veteran's conduct or progress is unsatis43
factory.
For such persons as are eligible for the educational benefits provided
by this Act, according to the rules of eligibility, the Act provides :4
(a) for payment by the Government of all tuition and other fees,
cost of books, supplies, equipment and other necessary expenses, not to
exceed a maximum of $500.00 per year;
(b) for payment by the Government of a subsistence allowance to
the veteran while he pursues such education in the amount of $50.00
per month if he is without dependents or $75.00 per month if he has
dependents, including regular holidays and leave, sick and otherwise,
not exceeding thirty days in a calendar year;
(c) for the retention by the veteran as his personal property of all
books and equipment furnished if he satisfactorily completes the course.
Applications for these educational benefits should be filed by the
veteran with a regional office of the Veterans' Administration or with
the approved educational institution which he wishes to attend. The
regional office of the Veterans' Administration in North Carolina is
located at Fayetteville and veterans residing in this State or those who
wish to go to school in the State should file their applications there.
Applications will be processed as rapidly as possible by the Veterans'
Administration; and a veteran's notice of eligibility, including statement
of the exact period of his approved education, will be furnished him in
duplicate. One copy should be filed by him with the institution which
he wishes to attend. That is all that will be required of him. Thereafter such details as the payment of tuition, etc., will be handled direct
45
between the institution and the Veterans' Administration.
"Id. at sect. 400(b)3.

"Id. at sect. 400(b)3.
"Id. at sect. 400(b)5.
"' Veterat&'Administration Service Letter, dated July 1, 1944.
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TITLE III: LOANS FOR THE PURCHASE OR CONSTRUCTION OF

HOMES, FARMS AND BUSINESS PROPERTIES

The pertinent provisions of this title are as follows:
1. The Government will guarantee the repayment of a loan not to
exceed $2,000, or 50% of the amount of the loan,48 made to any eligible
veteran for the purchase or construction of a home ;47 for the purchase
of any business, land, buildings, supplies, equipment, machinery, or
tools to be used by the veteran in pursuing a gainful occupation other
than farming;48 or for the purchase of any land, buildings, livestock,
equipment, machinery or implements, or in repairing, altering or improving any buildings or equipment, to be used in farming operations. 49
2. To be eligible for such guaranty, the following conditions must
be met: 50
(a) the veteran must have served in active military or naval service
for a minimum of ninety days after September 16, 1940, or he must
have been discharged by reason of a service-connected disability;
(b) the veteran must have been discharged under conditions other
than dishonorable;
(c) application for the guaranty must be made within two years of
discharge or within two years of the termination of the war, whichever
is the later date, but in no event later than five years following the
termination of the war;
(d) the guaranty must not exceed 50% of the loan or loans and
may not exceed $2,000 in the aggregate;
(e) interest on the loans guaranteed by the Government shall not
exceed 4% per annum;
(f) loans guaranteed must be payable within twenty years;
(g) loans guaranteed may be made by any person, firm or corporation, governmental or private, either state or federal.
3. In addition to guaranteeing the repayment of not to exceed 50%
of such a loan, the Government will pay outright the full amount of
interest for the first year on that part of the loan guaranteed by the
Government. 51
4. No security for-the guarantee by the Government shall be required "except the right to be subrogated to the lien rights of the
holder of the obligation which is guaranteed"; and the mortgagor and
mortgagee are required to agree that before foreclosure proceedings
are begun, the Veterans' Administrator shall be given thirty days notice
of default. The Administrator shall have the option of bidding in the
52
property at the foreclosure sale or refinancing the loan.
"'See note 27, supra at sect. 500(a).
"7
Id. at sect. 501(a).
- 5 Id. at sect. 503.
'Old.at sect. 502.
Id. at sect. 500(a), (b), (c).
"IId.at sect. 500(b).

r'Id. at sect. 500(b).
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5. Liability under the guaranty shall decrease or increase pro rata
with any increase or decrease of the amount of the unpaid portion of
the obligation.53
6. Before making such guaranty the Veterans' Administrator is required to satisfy himself that the loan is practicable 54 -that is, that it
is sound from the standpoint of appraised value of the property and
that the ability and experience of the veteran are such that he may be
expected to keep up the payments.
7. After making provision for the guarantee of loans under the
foregoing terms and conditions, the Act 53 provides that if the original
loan is made by a Federal agency or guaranteed or insured by such
agency, and the veteran finds himself in need of a second loan to cover
the remainder of the purchase price or cost, or a part thereof, the
Veterans' Administrator may guarantee the full amount of the second
loan, provided the guarantee in the aggregate shall not exceed* $2,000
and the second loan shall not exceed 20% of the purchase price or cost
and that the rate of interest on the second loan shall not exceed that on
the principal loan by more than 1%.
An interesting question arises under the subrogation provision above
referred to in the event of default. It is this:
Will the Government, upon payment of the part it guaranteed and
upon foreclosure by the mortgagee, share pro rata with the mortgagee
in the net proceeds of the sale or will the position of the Government
be analogous to that of a second mortgagee? Remember the language
of the Act itself: "No security for the guaranty of a loan shall be required except the right to be subrogated to the lien rights of the holder
of the obligation which is guaranteed." 5 6
Arguments may be advanced in support of the view that the Government, by payment of its guaranty, becomes subrogated to the lien
rights of the holder of the r'bligation as a legal incident of the loan
itself and that the mortgagee who lent his money with the knowledge
of the law must have understood that if he demands payment of the
Government's guaranty that the latter, upon payment, takes an assignment of all his lien rights to the extent of the payment under the guaranty. This position is supported by the further argument that the
words of the Act "to be subiogated to the lien rights of the holder of
the obligation" 5' contemplates an agreement between the mortgagor and
mortgagee and the Government that, upon the payment by the Government of its guaranty, it shall be subrogated to all the legal rights of the
mortgagee, and that thus a conventional subrogation rather than a legal
subrogation was intended. If this view should prevail it would mean
"Id. at sect. 500(c).
"Id. at sect. 505.
I; Ibid.

"Id. at sect. 500(a).

"Id. at sect. 500(b).
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that the Government would have the right to recoup the full amount
it pays under the guaranty before any of the funds received in liquidation of the security would be available to the mortgagee.
This does not seem to be a sound position for several reasqns:
1. Such a holding would go a long way toward defeating the very
purpose of the Act. That purpose was clearly expressed by the language itself which refers to the Government as an absolute guarantor
of a part of the loan. Obviously the purpose of the Government guaranteeing the payment of a part of the loan was to induce private lenders
to put their money to work in such a way as would benefit veterans.
If the Government is, upon default and liquidation of the security, to
recoup its payment under the guaranty before the mortgagee begins to
participate in the funds received from liquidation, the mortgagee might
just as well lend the entire amount itself. And if the loan is a sound
one from the standpoint of banking or money-lending, private interests
would, of course, be willing and anxious to make the loan without
relying on the Government's guaranty. But this part of the Act, at
least, seems to contemplate that loans will be made which are not sound
enough for private institutions or individuals; and it is for this reason
that the Government, as a benefit to the veteran, agrees to guarantee a
part of the loan. If it is the purpose of the Government to cause loans
to be made which private interests would not make on their own responsibility, this purpose must not be defeated by such an interpretation
of the language used.
2. The facts do not seem to bring this contemplated transaction
within the rule applicable to subrogation by convention. In the first
place, conventional subrogation can take effect only by agreement between the parties. 58 Such agreement must, like other agreements, be
supported by a consideration. 59 While it is true, in some jurisdictions
at least, that an express agreement is not required, 60 unless one exists
the facts and circumstances must be such that an agreement may be
iriplied.6 1 It is doubtful, to say the least, that such an inference could
be proper from the -existing circumstances and facts. It seems to be
the better view that Congress had in mind legal subrogation rather than
conventional subrogation; and in legal subrogation, which is a doctrine
founded in equity, 62 the right of a surety or guarantor, who pays part
11 STORY, EQurrY JuRisPRUDErcE (14th ed., 1918) 706; SHELDON, THE LAW OF
SUBROGATION

(2d ed.) 372; 60 C. J. §704(13); Wallace v. Benner,200 N. C. 124,

156 S.E. 795 (1931).

60 C. J. §704(14) ; Publishing Company v. Barber, 165 N. C. 478, 81 S. E.
694 0060
(1914).
C. J. §704(14).
60 C. J. §704(15).
82

(14th ed., 1918) 706; SHELDON, THE LAW OF
(2d ed.) §1; 60 C. J. §696(3), Powell v. Wake Water Company,

STORY, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENcE

SUBROGATION

171 N. C. 290, 88 S. E. 426 (1916).
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only of a debt, to be subrogated to the lien of the creditor does not
63
arise until the debt has been fully paid.
In conformity with this view, the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs has held that the right of the Government to be subrogated to the
lien rights of the holder of the obligation gives the Government, upon
the payment of its guaranty, lien rights against the property serving as
security for the loan, which are secondary to the lien rights of the
holder of the obligation. 64 This interpretation should nake loans made
under the Act very attractive to private individuals and lending institutions.
Another interesting question which will arise in the interpretation
of the Act is this:
Is the Government, as guarantor, obligated to pay, at the time of
any default and upon demand being made by the mortgagee, the full
amount of the sum guaranteed, subject only to pro rata adjustment
covering any decrease in the amount of the unpaid balance, or does the
proviso "that the liability under the guaranty shall decrease or increase
pro rata with any decrease or increase of the amount of the unpaid
portion of the obligation" 5 change the position of the Government
from that of absolute guarantor to that of indemnitor as to a percentage
of any ultimate loss?
To put it in concrete form, assume a loan of $4,000, of which 50%
or $2,000 is guaranteed by the Government; assume further that the
loan was curtailed in the usual way by $1,000, leaving a balance of
$3,000 when default occurs. Must the Government thereupon promptly
pay its part of the balance-and will that part be the full $2,000 guaranteed or will it be 50% of the $3,000 balance, $1,500; or must the
mortgagee foreclose and may the Government satisfy its guaranty by
paying 50%o of the deficiency?
These are questions that assuredly will arise and for light on the
subject let us turn to the language of the Act itself. Giving the words
of the section their ordinary meaning, it seems clear that the purpose
of the proviso above quoted was to reduce the Government's liability
on its guaranty as payments were made on the principal. If the proviso
had not been inserted, the Government's liability in the illustration just
used would be to pay $2,000 of the $3,000 in default; but the inclusion
of the proviso would seem to provide a constant percentage of liability
for the unpaid portion of the 'debt, which would reduce the Government's liability to $1,500 or 50% of thd balance due. If at foreclosure
sale the property brings $1,500, the mortgagee will get it all. If it
" 60 C. J. §719(28). SHELDON, THE LAW OF SUBROGATION (2d ed.) §7;
RESTATEmENT, RESTITUTION (1937) §162(c).
' Admnhistrator's Decision No. 590, dated September 29, 1944.
" See note 27, supra at sect. 500(c).
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brings $2,000, the mortgagee will take the first $1,500 and the Government will recoup $500.00 on its $1,500 payment under the guaranty.
It also seems to be the best view that the liability of the Government
to make good on its guarantee becomes absolute at the time of default.
To hold otherwise would destroy much of the purpose and spirit of
the Act. In specific terms the Act speaks of the Government as guarantor, and there is a well recognized difference between a guarantee of
payment and a contract of indemnity against loss. 66

The general rule

is clear that the liability of an absolute guarantor attaches immediately
upon default by the principal. 67
The Act provides that: "Loans guaranteed by the Administrator
under this title shall be payable under such terms and conditions as
may be approved by the Administrator." 68 Under this authority the
Administrator has promulgated regulations which provide that upon
receipt of a claim under the guaranty he shall' have the following
options :69
1. Pay to the creditor not later than one month after receipt of
notice of any default, as a partial payment of any actual or potential
-claim under the guaranty, the amount of principal, interest, taxes, advances, or other items in default; and in consideration of such payment
the lender shall be deemed to have agreed to refrain from giving effect
to any acceleration provisions by reason of defaults prior to the date
of notice of default theretofore given; provided, however, that unless
the creditor consents, the Administrator may exercise this option once
only, and in an amount not exceeding an amount equivalent to the aggregate of principal and interest payable in one year, or not exceeding
ten per centum of the original amount of the guaranty, whichever sum
is less.
2. Pay the creditor within one month after receipt of claim the full
amount payable under the guaranty without requiring foreclosure, or
personal action.
3. Pay to the creditor promptly after receipt of claim any amount
agreed upon, not exceeding the amount due under the guaranty; and
notify him to institute appropriate foreclosure proceedings, with, or
without, legal action to reduce the debt to judgment, against all or any
of the parties liable thereon, and whose names are stated in such notice
to the creditor.
4. If the creditor does not begin appropriate action within two
months after receipt of notice to institute action as provided in option
3 above, the Administrator shall be entitled to begin and prosecute the
same to completion in the name of the creditor, or of the Administrator
on behalf of the United States, as may be appropriate under applicable
laws and rules of procedure; provided, however, that in such event the
' 38 C. J. S., p. 1134, §5; 28 C. J. §892(8).
e38 C. J.S., p. 1227, §66; 28 C. J.§990(149).
CS See note 27, supra at sect. 500(c).
CO Regulations of the Veterans Administration, Part 36, Title 38, CODE OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS.
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Administrator shall pay, (in advance if required under the practice in
the jurisdiction) all court costs, andl other expenses, and provide the
legal services required.
Another practical question which may be expected to arise may be
illustrated by the following example:
Suppose John Smith, who is a veteran, decides to buy a house. He
finds one that suits him and the owner offers it to him for $3,800. It
later develops that there are additional charges amounting to $200.00
for searching the title, surveyor's fees, service charges and other expenses which will run the gross cost to $4,000. Under these circumstances, will the Government guarantee 50% of $4,000, which would
be $2,000, or 50% of only $3,800, which would be $1,900?
The Administrator of Veterans' Affairs has held that the Government will guarantee 50% of the gross loan of $4,000 or, -to put it
another way, will permit the inclusion of incidental expenses, such as
attorneys' fees, etc., as part of the principal sum to be guaranteed by
the Government.1 0 The Administrator based his ruling on a finding
that such incidental expenses are usually borne by the purchaser and
become, in point of practice, a part of the purchase price.
TITLE IV: EMPLOYMENT OF VETERANS

Briefly, this title provides for the creation of a Veterans' Placement
Service Board to consist of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, the
Director of Selective Service, and the Administrator of the Federal
Security Agency. The board is given authority to determine all mat'ters of policy relating to the administration of the Veterans' Employment Service of the United States Employment Service. The policies
adopted by the board will be carried out through the instrumentality
of the Veterans' Employment Representative in the states or through
the Director of Selective Service and persons engaged in the activities
authorized under Section 8 of the Selective Training and Service Act
of 1940, as amended.
TITLE V: READJUSTMENT ALLOWANCES FOR VETERANS

WHO AlRE UNEMPLOYED

1. To be eligible for such an allowance a person must :71
(a) have served in some branch of the armed forces for ninety days
after September 16, 1940, and prior to the termination of the war;
(b) have been discharged or released under conditions other than
dishonorable, or have been discharged as a result of a service-connected
disability;
"oAdministrator'sDecision No. 591, dated September 29, 1944.
71 See note 27, suPra at sect. 700(a).
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(c) not be receiving a subsistence allowance for education under
Title II or increased pension for vocational training;
(d) be residing in the United States at the time of filing a claim;
(e) be completely unemployed or, if partially employed, at wages
less than $23.00 per week;
(f) be registered with and continue to report to a public employment office in accordance with its regulations;
(g) be able to work and be available for any "suitable work." Inability to work due to sickness or disability which occurs after the
commencement of the period of unemployment will not be considered
as a bar.
2. A person otherwise eligible for an allowance shall be ineligible
if :72

(a) he leaves suitable work voluntarily, without good cause, or is
suspended or discharged for misconduct in the course of employment;
(b) he fails, without good cause, to apply for "suitable work" to
which he has been referred by a public employment office, or to accept
"suitable work" when offered to him;
(c) he fails, without good cause, to attend an available free training course as may be required by regulations which shall be issued
pursuant to the provisions of this title;
(d) he participates in or is directly interested in a labor dispute
which causes a stoppage of work.
3. The amount of allowance shall be $20.00 per week, less that part
of wages payable to the veteran for part-time work performed during
78
the week which is in excess of $3.00 per week.
4. A limit of fifty-two weeks is provided as a total period during
which allowances may be paid 74 and the period of unemployment for
which allowances may be paid must occur not later than two years after
discharge. 75 No allowance shall be payable for any period of unemployment which occurs more than five years after the end of the war.78
5. Eight weeks of allowances shall be paid for each of the veteran's
first three months of service and four weeks of allowances shall be paid
for each additional month of service. 77
6. Any person eligible under the foregoing provisions, and subject
to the conditions and limitations aforesaid, who is self-employed for
profit in an independent establishment, trade, profession or any other
vocation shall be entitled to a readjustment allowance in an amount
equal to the difference between his "net earnings" less than $100.00
per month and the sum of $100.00 per month.79
" Id. at sect. 800(a).
"Id. at sect. 900(a).
" Id. at sect. 700(a).
Id. at sect. 700(a).
"Id. at sect. 700(a).
"Id. at sect. 900(b).
" Id. at sect. 902 (a) (b).
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The question will immediately arise as to what will constitute "net
earnings" within the meaning of the Act. The term appears in the
Act without any elaboration or definition. We may therefore assume
that the Congress did not intend to subject the term to a precise technical definition as is required in tax returns, but intended for the language to be given its ordinary meaning. Reduced to the briefest terms
possible, "net earnings" would seem to mean the net amount a veteran
actually realizes from his earnings in any given month.
It will not be very difficult to determine a veteran's net income during a given month if he keeps an approved set of books or if he receives
income during every month in the year. But what about a farmer who
works many months during the year without any, or very little, monthly
income and usually realizes his income for the entire year during the
fall when crops are harvested? Will such individuals be entitled to a
readjustment allowance during the months when they have no income?
A variation of the problem might be the case of a farmer, or even
a manufacturer or other producer who holds his product from the market in the hope of receiving a better price later on.
Of course, there has 'developed no jurisprudence on the subject, and
we shall have to await rulings on particular cases and use them as
precedents before we can have any assurance of what the final decisions will be in such cases. The Administrator of Veterans' Affairs,
however, has issued a decision which discusses this subject; and the following significant quotations are taken from it :79
"A veteran, for instance a farmer, who works several months and,
as the result of his effort, had at the end thereof an investment in his
growing crops or who in the following months harvested his crop but
had not yet sold it or otherwise realized thereon, may nevertheless be
without 'net earnings' within the contemplation of that term as used
in the statute under our present consideration. It will be borne in
mind that a purpose of the law is to provide readjustment allowances
covering the time the veteran has insufficient earnings for livelihood
covering a transition period as provided for in the statute from his war
service to peace-time pursuit.
"The fact that in some cases the fruit of a veteran's labor might be
held from month to month for a better market would not be determinative, as under existing conditions he might realize therefrom sufficient
earnings for his living. As to his work, the veteran should not be required to dispose of his production out of the ordinary course at a disadvantage to him. The customs, incidents, and advantages of any line
of business or endeavor should be permitted in its regular course and
" Adminstrator's Decision No. 592, dated October 12, 1944.
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the benefits of the statute should not be dependent upon changes or
curtailment therein.
"Take for instance, the self-employed veteran who works without
receiving any returns for six months and then on -the last day of the
sixth month sells his crop for a substantial sum and puts the money
in the bank. Then he proposes to start this process over again. It is
possible that under such procedure, if permitted, he could receive the
unemployment allowance for several months in all, notwithstanding the
fact that he had been gainfully self-employed, had realized on the fruits
of his labor and by virtue thereof possessed sufficient funds for his
livelihood. It would appear that in such circumstances the purpose of
the statute had been served by carrying him to the point of normal
return."
It appears from this decision that the Administrator of Veterans'
Affairs is disposed to give a liberal interpretation to the language used
in the Act. This no doubt is based upon the apparent intent of the
Congress to make provision that the veteran have sufficient earnings
for his livelihood as he undertakes to readjust himself to civilian life
following the completion of his military or naval service.
TITLE

VI: GENERAL ADMINISTRATION AND PENAL PROVISIONS

While the provisions of this title are important, they are not complicated and will not be discussed here. There are, however, certain
administrative provisions which appear throughout the Act which are
worthy of citation. They are as follows:
1. The Administrator of Veterans' Affairs is authorized to administer the Act and is authorized to utilize existing facilities and services
of federal and state departments or agencies on the basis of mutual
agreements with such departments or agencies. 80 He shall, consistent
with the provisions of the Act, prescribe such rules and regulations and
require such records and reports as he may find necessary to carry out
such purposes. 81 And he shall transmit to the Congress annually a
82
report of operations under the Act.

2. The authority to issue subpoenas and provisions for invoking
aid of the courts of the United States, to make investigations, and to
administer oaths, as contained in 49 STAT. 2033-3A, 38 U. S. C., §§131133, shall be applicable in the administration of the title.88
3. Any claimant who knowingly accepts an allowance to which he
is not entitled shall be ineligible to accept any further allowance under
"oSee note 27, supra at sect. 1100(a).
81
1Id. at sect. 1100(b).
82 Id. at sect. 1504.
8

Id.at sect. 1200.
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the title, and whoever, for the purpose of causing an increase in any
allowance authorized under the title, or for the purpose of causing an
allowance to be paid when none is authorized under the title, or whoever makes or causes to be made any false statement of a material fact
in any claim for an allowance, or any false statement, representation,
affidavit, or document in connection with a claim 'shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not more than $1,000
84
or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
4. Any veteran whose claim for allowance is denied by the local
office may appeal. The appeal will be heard by the Readjustment Allowance Agent, a representative of the Administrator of Veterans'
Affairs. The decision of this agent, if adverse, may then be appealed to
the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, whose decision will be final. 85
In conclusion, I should like for it to be understood that I am discussing this Act and Section 8 of the Selective Service Act as an individual. My comments and conclusions should not be considered as
having any official significance whatever. I have no authority to speak
for the Selective Service System or the Veterans' Administration.
Every case which may arise under either of the acts under consideration
will have to stand on its own bottom and the facts and circumstances
in each individual case will have to be considered separately until precedents are established. Although all of us have the right to "sound off"
from time to time and express our personal views as to the meaning
of the language used in the acts, it should be remembered that none of
us can be sure that his interpretation is correct until the courts have
spoken.
"Id. at sect. 1300, 1301(a).
"'Id.at sect. 1102.

